By Haider A. Khan (auth.)
Read or Download Global Markets and Financial Crises in Asia: Towards a Theory for the 21st Century PDF
Best macroeconomics books
Principles of Macroeconomics (5th Edition)
Ideas OF MACROECONOMICS is still the most well-liked and ordinary textual content in economics study rooms at the present time. The 5th variation includes a powerful revision of content material in all 36 chapters whereas preserving the transparent, available writing type and exact presentation which are the hallmark of this hugely revered writer.
Blanchard provides a unified and international view of macroeconomics, permitting scholars to determine the connections among the short-run, medium-run, and long-run.
From the key fiscal situation to the funds deficits of the us, the designated packing containers during this textual content were up-to-date to exhibit the lifetime of macroeconomics this present day and toughen the teachings from the versions, making them extra concrete and more straightforward to understand.
Confidence, credibility, and macroeconomic policy: past, present, future
Self assurance, Credibility and Macroeconomic coverage is split into 3 sections. half I is an outline of the inter-relationship among monetary coverage and credibility and inflation. half II specializes in empirical learn and provides old in addition to modern proof at the value of public self assurance and expectancies to the good fortune of economic and fiscal coverage.
Additional resources for Global Markets and Financial Crises in Asia: Towards a Theory for the 21st Century
Example text
The state banks’ lending and deposit rates were controlled. The deposit rates were set at 6 per cent a month – equivalent to an annual rate of 72 per cent. The state banks received subsidies to compensate for the differences in the rates. After October 1968, the state banks received a 30 per cent subsidy on the interest rate they paid on 6- and 12-month deposits. The subsidy on 12-month deposits was reduced to one per cent by 17 March 1969 and was eliminated completely on 1 May 1969 – only to reappear on 9 April 1974 at a much higher level.
In early March, the central bank also announced the setting up of a Property Loan Management Organization (PLMO) to provide 100 billion baht in five-year loans to ailing property firms. The funds were to be raised by issuing seven-year, zero-coupon bonds guaranteed by the government. Finally, the cabinet accepted a 106 billion baht downsizing in the 1996/97 budget. Through these initiatives, the Thai government seemed to have averted devaluation of the baht and a deep financial crisis. But it only turned out to be a way of delaying the inevitable.
As FDI stopped and some existing factories scaled down their operations, even sectors like the automobile industry announced layoffs. It is difficult to interpret the official statistics on unemployment since there is no overall national reporting system for job losses. 4 It is by now clear that the errors of the private sector in Thailand, the technocrats in BOI and MOF, and the Thai politicians were compounded by the initial knee-jerk reaction of the IMF. The wave of foreign capital that had entered Thailand in the 1990s after the financial liberalization also left hastily, thereby exacerbating the crisis of confidence and ultimately deepening the economic crisis.
