By Benjamin Johnson, Pascal Schöttle, Rainer Böhme (auth.), Jens Grossklags, Jean Walrand (eds.)

This booklet constitutes the refereed court cases of the 3rd foreign convention on selection and video game concept for safety, GameSec 2012, held in Budapest, Hungary, in November 2012.

The 18 revised complete papers offered have been rigorously reviewed and chosen from various submissions. The papers are prepared in topical sections on mystery communications, id of attackers, multi-step assaults, community defense, procedure protection, and purposes security.

**Read or Download Decision and Game Theory for Security: Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, November 5-6, 2012. Proceedings PDF**

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**Additional info for Decision and Game Theory for Security: Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, November 5-6, 2012. Proceedings**

**Sample text**

Let Pj be the other player. 1. If both players cooperate, denoted by (C, C), then τi is positive, li = 1 since Pi has learned the secret, and δ = 2 because both players have learned the secret. We have: ρ3 (C,C) . (a) = Ω ρ1 ωi + ρ2 + τi > 0, li = 1, δ = 2 ⇒ ui 3 2. If only Pi cooperates, denoted by (C, D), then τi is positive, li = 0 since Pi has not learned the secret, and δ = 1 because only player Pj has learned the secret. We have: (C,D) τi > 0, li = 0, δ = 1 ⇒ ui (a) = Ω ρ1 ωi . 3. If only Pj cooperates, denoted by (D, C), then τi is negative, li = 1 since Pi has learned the secret, and δ = 1 because only player Pi has learned the secret.

R. Stinson Our Solution in Nutshell In our “socio-rational” setting, the players are “selﬁsh” similar to standard rational secret sharing. In addition, they have “concerns” about future gain or loss since our secret sharing game is repeated an unknown number of times. We term this new type of the player, a rational foresighted player. In the proposed scheme, each player has a reputation value which is updated according to his behavior each time the game is played. The initial reputation value is zero and its computation is public.

We seek to compute the inspection level and punishment level for an “effective” scheme. The challenge in modeling the complex interaction between the auditor and audited agent includes making reasonable abstractions and assumptions. We model the interaction between an organization (the defender) and the insider (the adversary) as a repeated game with imperfect information (the defender does not observe the adversary’s actions) and public signals (the outcome of the audit is public). The model captures a number of important economic considerations that influence the design of audit mechanisms.